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State-supported sectoral bargaining through wage boards is gaining
traction among some U.S. reformers interested in revitalizing unions,
collective bargaining, and labor law. New York has become a celebrated
case, but the recent experience there left some activists disappointed.
Theoretically, revitalization through wage boards is also complicated.
Labor law doctrine, which favors labor union autonomy from the state, might
endorse state-created wage boards, but only in a qualified manner.
Moreover, reformers consider union membership growth to be important for
labor revitalization. And yet, empirical studies have shown that sectoral
bargaining has an indeterminate impact on union membership.
Given New York’s uneven results, and theoretical qualifications and
indeterminacies, this article presents Uruguay as an exploratory study of
wage boards to understand what we could learn from the South American
country. This article describes how Uruguay’s wage councils, convened in
various periods since 1943, revitalized labor unions in the South American
country. However, specific economic, institutional, and political conditions
facilitated the success of the wage councils, pointing at the socio-historical
specificities needed for successful wage board strategies. In that light, this
article concludes with hypotheses on the possibility of wage board success
in the United States and issues for further research to better comprehend the
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I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. union membership is at about 6% density in the private sector,
placing unions and labor law into deep crisis.1 Given this predicament,
1. Union density typically refers to the number of union members as a proportion of the overall
number of employed workers in non-agricultural industry. James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman,
Introduction to THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 4 (James T.
Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2002); see also Richard Bales, Union Trends, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (Richard Bales & Charlotte Garden
eds., 2020) (noting that union density decline has reduced unions’ capacity to use the strike as an
economic weapon and their overall political power); JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO
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American think tanks,2 legal scholars,3 Harvard Law School’s Clean Slate
for Worker Power project,4 and the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU),5 among others, have been boldly advocating for legal changes that
can revitalize labor unions through a wage board strategy that spurs sectoral
bargaining.6 Sectoral bargaining, typically associated with many continental
European collective bargaining systems, aims to cover entire industrial
sectors and its workers. It contrasts with enterprise-based collective
bargaining, generally set at the firm level, which pervades in the United
States and in some other jurisdictions. Sectoral bargaining can be a useful
tool to compress wages and curb income inequality.7 It could also be,
although the evidence here is less clear, a tool to recruit new union members.8
Wage boards—one way by which to institute some form of sectoral
68–83 (2014) (explaining how union density decline has contributed to the fall of wages for union and
non-union workers alike, exacerbating U.S. economic inequality).
2. See, e.g., David Madland, How to Promote Sectoral Bargaining in the United States, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND (July 10, 2019, 12:01 AM), https:// www.americanprogressaction.org/
issues/ economy/reports/2019/07/10/174385/promote-sectoral-bargaining-united-states/; KATE ANDRIAS
& BRISHEN ROGERS, ROOSEVELT INST., REBUILDING WORKER VOICE IN TODAY’S ECONOMY (2018).
But see OECD, OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2018 § 3.3.1 (2018) (advocating principally for
“organized decentralization” and explaining how traditional extension policies lacking coordination
promote free riding and stifle productivity growth).
3. See generally Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016).
4. See BENJAMIN SACHS & SHARON BLOCK, CLEAN SLATE FOR WORKER POWER, CLEAN SLATE
FOR WORKER POWER: BUILDING A JUST ECONOMY AND DEMOCRACY 37–45 (2020), https://uploadsssl.webflow.com/5fa42ded15984eaa002a7ef2/5fa42ded15984e5a8f2a8064_CleanSlate_Report_FORW
EB.pdf.
5. See Nicole Berner & Dora Chen, SEIU Conditions 2020 Presidential Endorsement on Demand
for “Unions for All,” ONLABOR (Aug. 21, 2019), https:// onlabor.org/ seiu-conditions-2020-presidentialendorsement-on-demand-for-unions-for-all/.
6. See generally DAVID MADLAND, RE-UNION: HOW BOLD LABOR REFORMS CAN REPAIR,
REVITALIZE, AND REUNITE THE UNITED STATES (2021). One telling fact of labor law’s demise is that U.S.
labor law once contributed to a system where one third of U.S. workers were union members and were
covered by collective bargaining agreements, while also supporting conditions where many non-union
workers benefitted from similar conditions. Today, at less than 6% density in the private sector, labor law
can no longer deliver for most U.S. workers. Rather than trying to mimic union contracts, employers shun
union conditions and terms. See, e.g., Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in
U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 518–19 (2011) (explaining U.S. union decline).
7. Madland, supra note 2; OECD, supra note 2, § 3.3 (discussing wage dispersion in countries
with diverse systems of collective bargaining).
8. See Lyle Scruggs, The Ghent System and Union Membership in Europe, 1970-1996, 55 POL.
RES. Q. 275, 283 (2002) (stating that labor market centralization is ambiguously related to union
membership); Joelle Sano & John B. Williamson, Factors Affecting Union Decline in 18 OECD
Countries and Their Implications for Labor Movement Reform, 49 INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 479, 492–93
(2008) (showing that the relationship between bargaining centralization, corporatism, and union
membership is not significant unless one also considers historical contexts of collective bargaining and
representation); OECD, supra note 2, § 3.5.1 (“The use of administrative extensions and erga omnes
clauses . . . may have weakened the incentives to join a union (as non-union members enjoy the same
rights as union members).”).
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bargaining—are arrangements where government, management, and labor
jointly set minimum wages within an industrial sector.9
One specific event that kindled recent U.S. interest in sectoral
bargaining was New York State’s 2016 activation of a wage board to
increase minimum wages in fast food. The wage board was convened at the
insistence of the Fight for $15 movement and under the authority of the
state’s seldom-used minimum wage legislation.10 It was to some extent
successful, given that the state was able to increase wages to fifteen dollars
an hour in the sector by 2021, which was one of the goals of the activists.11
Shortly thereafter, Professor Kate Andrias published an influential article in
the Yale Law Journal making the case for sectoral bargaining through wage
boards, taking New York State as important inspiration.12
But while sectoral bargaining may revitalize U.S. labor, the New York
experience still left some labor advocates wanting more.13 First, the wage
board convening did not produce the organizational and institutional results
sought by some activists.14 Restaurant industry leaders resisted singling out
fast food employers for a wage hike, eschewing any sector-based wage
regulation.15 McDonald’s expressly stated that it would not meet with the
Fight for $15 or the union that backed it, the SEIU, because neither group
formally represented McDonald’s employees.16
One factor that might explain the disappointing results is that while the
New York wage boards must represent management, labor, and the public
interest (i.e., the government), they do not need to represent the specific
employers and workers directly affected by the minimum wages.17 Actual
fast-food employer and worker representatives did not bargain with each

9. See generally Andrias, supra note 3.
10. Id. at 64–67.
11. Id. at 66.
12. See id.
13. See Tom Juravich, Fight for $15: The Limits of Symbolic Power—Juravich Comments on
Ashby, 42 LAB. STUD. J. 394, 395 (2017) (criticizing merely “symbolic” successes); Jonathan Rosenblum,
Fight for $15: Good Wins, but Where Did the Focus on Organizing Go?, 42 LAB. STUD. J. 387, 388–89
(2017) (noting that the Fight for $15 has yet to organize a union).
14. A new group called “Fast Food Justice” grew out of the campaign to represent fast food
workers. The group, however, cannot engage in collective bargaining because it has not organized itself
as formal labor organization. It has 2,000 members, out of 65,000 fast food workers in New York City.
STEVEN GREENHOUSE, BEATEN DOWN, WORKED UP: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN
LABOR 249 (2019).
15. See Patrick McGeehan, New York Plans $15-an-Hour Minimum Wage for Fast-Food Workers,
N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), https:// www.nytimes.com/ 2015/07/23/nyregion/new-york-minimum-wagefast-food-workers.html.
16. GREENHOUSE, supra note 14, at 248.
17. See N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 653(2), 655(1) (Consol. 2021).
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other.18 Board members heard the public, including representatives of fastfood workers, on whether wages in fast food were sufficient to “provide
adequate maintenance and to protect the health and livelihood” of workers—
the standard mandated by law.19 However, such feedback hardly counts as
bargaining over terms. Despite some claims to the contrary by the Fight for
$15 leadership who argued that there was “collective bargaining” in that
experience, it was the Board—not the affected parties—who provided the
wage recommendation to the Commissioner of Labor, who then adopted it.20
In this sense, the New York wage board did not facilitate the kind of
meaningful collective bargaining where labor unions negotiated wages with
management.
Concerned about U.S. labor union decline, recognizing the benefits of
sectoral bargaining, but also acknowledging the underwhelming results of
the 2016 New York experience, this article seeks to understand the
conditions under which sectoral bargaining through wage boards can
revitalize labor unions in the United States. By revitalization we mean (1)
increase union membership, (2) foster new labor and employer organizations
that can bargain collectively, and (3) encourage new spaces where labor
unions and employers set wages and other conditions of employment. To
answer the question, this article offers a case known for the success of wage
boards in revitalizing labor: Uruguay.21 Uruguay’s wage boards, called

18. See id.
19. See id. §§ 653(1)–(2), 654, 655(3).
20. Andrias, supra note 3, at 64–65.
21. See Sebastián Etchemendy, Uruguay and Contemporary Theories of Wage Coordination:
Origins and Stabilization of Segmented Neocorporatism, 2005–2019, 63 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 51,
57 (2021) (“[Uruguay] is simply the only instance of stable democratic neocorporatism in any historical
pattern of interest representation in Latin America.”). In the political science literature, sectoral
bargaining systems are associated with so-called corporatist or neocorporatist regimes. Id. Some other
countries set minimum wages through tripartite boards and could be studied to better understand the
relationship between wage boards and labor union organization. These include Estonia, Lithuania,
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Thorsten Schulten & Torsten Müller, Between Poverty
Wages and Living Wages: Minimum Wage Regimes in the European Union, 1 EUR. STUD. FOR SOC. &
LAB. MKT. POL’Y 1, 7 (2020). Parts of China might also have such boards. See Sarah Biddulph,
Responding to Industrial Unrest in China: Prospects for Strengthening the Role of Collective Bargaining,
34 SYDNEY L. REV. 35, 51 (2012) (noting tripartite collective bargaining in the woolen knitwear industry
of Xinhe township). The U.K. was also known for its wage councils. See Susan Hayter & Jelle Visser,
The Application and Extension of Collective Agreements: Enhancing the Inclusiveness of Labour
Protection, in COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS: EXTENDING LABOUR PROTECTION 1, 25 (Susan Hayter & Jelle
Visser eds., 2018). Puerto Rico had tripartite wage committees from about the 1940s through the late
1970s. See generally César F. Rosado Marzán, Can Wage Boards Revive U.S. Labor?: Marshaling
Evidence from Puerto Rico, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127 (2020). Chile also had tripartite wage
commissions. See Lance Compa, Labor Law and the Legal Way: Collective Bargaining in the Chilean
Textile Industry Under the Unidad Popular 32 (Yale Law School Program in Law and Modernization,
Working Paper No. 23, 1973), http:// digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ workingpapers/98/.

ERMIDA MACRO 3.1.22 (DO NOT DELETE)

114

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/1/2022 9:16 PM

[Vol 32:109

salary (or wage) councils (consejos de salarios), have helped strengthen
union organizations in some periods since the 1940s.22
Case studies like this one are “especially useful to examine causal
mechanisms; that is, the sequence or pathway that connects x with y in a
plausible fashion.”23 Here, the pathway that we are trying to examine is the
connection between sectoral bargaining (x) and labor union revitalization (y).
In making such inference from the “extreme case” of Uruguay, which
contains all elements of so-called “neocorporatist” countries, or countries
where economic matters are negotiated by organized groups, rather than
determined by markets, we can also start to comprehend whether sectoral
bargaining has any hope for the United States. In other words, we are trying
to understand whether the United States has, or could have, conditions such
as those observable in Uruguay that made sectoral bargaining successful in
Uruguay, and that might also make sectoral bargaining successful in the
United States.
Because the main task of this article is theoretical, it summarizes
doctrine, or normative theory, regarding collective bargaining, as well as
positive theories that try to explain when the specific form of collective
bargaining studied here, sectoral bargaining through wage boards,
contributes to labor union revitalization. After reviewing the theories and
analyzing how they help us make sense of the case of Uruguay, this article
argues that Uruguay’s success stems, importantly, from a system that
authorizes representative parties to set sectoral minimum wages. As we
explain, its system provides labor and employer representatives with
collective autonomy to bargain, giving unions institutional power that
complements the economic, or structural power of workers. But perhaps
more importantly, social democratic forces, including Uruguayan batllismo
and neobatllismo24 and the Frente Amplio (FA) established the political
22. See generally Sergio Gamonal Contreras & Pablo Arellano Ortiz, Negociación colectiva,
autonomía y abstención legislativa [Collective Bargaining, Autonomy, and Legislative Abstention], 3
REVISTA IUS ET PRAXIS 173 (2018) (describing the Uruguayan wage councils).
23. Etchemendy, supra note 21, at 57.
24. “Batllismo” is a term inspired by the legacy of President José Batlle y Ordóñez. He was leader
of the Colorado Party and was president from 1903–1907 and 1911–1915. See José Pedro Barrán &
Benjamín Nahum, El batllismo uruguayo y su reforma “moral” [Uruguayan Batllismo and its “Moral”
Reform], 23 DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO 121 (1983). Likewise, the Uruguayan version of a welfare state,
subsequently developed in Europe and elsewhere, was developed in Uruguay, in great measure, by
batllismo. See Aidan Rankin, Reflections on the Non-Revolution in Uruguay, 211 NEW LEFT REV. 131,
135 (1995). Typically, batllismo is associated with the first two decades of the 20th Century, during the
presidencies of José Batlle y Ordóñez. Neobatllistas are associated with the 1940s and 1950s Colorado
governments that focused on industrializing Uruguay through an import substitution strategy. See
GERARDO CAETANO & JOSÉ RILLA, HISTORIA CONTEMPORÁNEA DEL URUGUAY: DE LA COLONIA AL
SIGLO XXI [CONTEMPORY HISTORY OF URUGUAY: FROM THE COLONY TO THE 21ST CENTURY] 237–54
(2005).
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bases for an effective wage board system. The wage council system was
created by parliament in 1943. Governments that generally adhered to a
neobatllista social democratic political program then convened the wage
councils in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s. Then, after several decades of
dictatorship and neoliberal governments refusing to convene the wage
councils, the FA— Uruguay’s contemporary social democratic party—
reconvened the wage councils in 2005. This article thus strongly posits the
importance of politics for effective sectoral bargaining through wage boards.
This article further argues that doctrine, positive theory, and the
Uruguayan case bring some bad news to U.S. advocates who favor wage
boards. The United States lacks the conditions present in Uruguay that made
its wage boards effective. It lacks a national social democratic party with
programmatic interests in favor of giving unions and employers collective
autonomy to bargain for wages at the sectoral level. Without such a party, it
is unlikely that, even if legislated, wage boards will be convened in the
United States. U.S. economic openness also works against a wage board
strategy. However, not all news is bad: some U.S. states and localities with
economic, institutional, and political conditions different from those
generally existing in the United States might be able to institute an effective
sectoral bargaining approach.25 Moreover, U.S. political conditions may
change in ways difficult to predict, so keeping sectoral bargaining in a menu
of options remains important if the winds of change open opportunities for
it to flourish.
This article proceeds in the following manner:
Part II summarizes doctrinal foundations in international and U.S. law
regarding collective bargaining systems; these are built on the principle of
collective autonomy. Labor law recognizes the need for government to
support autonomous collective bargaining agents (labor and management).
Government can take a more intrusive role in those subjects or sectors where
collective bargaining cannot reach, but, even then, the bargaining agents
should be afforded a role in setting those terms.
Part II also argues that the principle of collective autonomy matters
because it compels us to assess the relative role of government in a
bargaining system, especially in a wage board arrangement where
government might be taking a heavy hand. It is an issue that Uruguayan
policymakers and government leaders had to deal with as they shaped their
system of wage councils, continuously trying to provide significant
autonomy to labor and management despite the state-supported nature of
25. In fact, some analysts are optimistic, if at least cautiously, about bringing progressive social
change to the United States through legal strategies in “Blue” cities. See SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, AN EQUAL
PLACE: LAWYERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LOS ANGELES 501–03 (2021).
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their system. Labor law doctrine should thus compel us to pause when we
observe a system such as New York’s, where the bargaining agents are not
representative of the sectors being regulated, where the regulated parties are
merely consulted alongside other members of the public, and where an
important party—management—may refuse to participate.
Part III reviews the social science literature on union revitalization. The
three main positive theories described are structural, institutional, and
political. This literature helps us to assess the relevant conditions that make
a system of sectoral bargaining effective.
Part IV describes the U.S. case, or more on point, the New York case
that recently inspired the law and policy commentary favoring sectoral
bargaining in the United States. It describes how that experience helped
increase wages in the fast-food sector through the convening of a tripartite
board and helped labor groups to form a non-union worker collective to keep
the organizing momentum going. It also describes the New York case’s
limits, including the absence of significant growth of union membership,
formation of new labor and employer organizations that can bargain
collectively, and new spaces where labor and management can meaningfully
set wages and other conditions of employment.
Part V describes the Uruguayan case, starting with the enactment of the
wage councils law of 1943. It shows how, despite being opposed by parts of
Uruguay’s labor movement (given its anarchist leanings), the labor
movement came to embrace the wage councils. The councils helped to
increase union membership in some key periods, supported the construction
of new union organizations, and expanded collective bargaining in new
spaces. Nevertheless, in the late 1960s, and through the 1980s, economic
crisis and dictatorship led to the demise of the wage councils system.
Governments adhering to neoliberal prescriptions also failed to convene the
wage councils from the late 1980s through the first half of the 2000s. It was
not until 2005, with the advent of the social democratic FA victory, that the
wage councils were reconvened. The FA convened the wage boards during
its concurrent administrations, which lasted from 2005–2020, successfully
aiding labor unions to revitalize.
Part VI analyzes the Uruguayan case considering the historical evidence
reported in Part V and the theories described in Parts II and III, arguing that
Uruguay’s implementation of collective autonomy principles effectively
institutionalized sectoral bargaining, which contributed to unions’
institutional power. Economics played some role. For example, Uruguayan
manufacturing, experiencing more external competition, contracted.
Employment numbers fell in that sector and, as a result, union membership
also diminished. On the other hand, workers in more shielded sectors
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experienced higher increases in labor union membership. Additionally, the
triumph of the FA was key in making the wage boards work, just as the
neobatllistas were central for the wage boards in the 1940s and 1950s. Union
membership grew, new labor and employer organizations were created, and
new spaces for collective bargaining surfaced. Minimum wages also
increased.
Part VI also articulates some hypotheses for the possible success of
sectoral bargaining in the United States. First, if the U.S. government passed
a law that grants collective autonomy for labor and management to bargain
wages sectorally, then unions’ institutional power should increase, and union
revitalization might prove more likely. Second, if U.S. economic policy
better protected workers from competition, be it through trade laws or by
better training and educating U.S. workers, U.S. workers’ structural power
would increase, making them more capable of organizing and effectively
using the wage boards in their favor. However, a wage board law,
progressive economic policy, and the very convening of wage boards will
depend on some type of organized social democratic political party, perhaps
a Democratic Party with significant influence from progressives. Since at the
time of this writing it is not realistic to expect that progressive Democrats
will hold the reins of power in Washington, national sectoral bargaining
remains aspirational in the United States. That said, some progressive
Democrats have sway in places such as New York City, Chicago, Seattle,
and San Francisco. Therefore, local or state-level sectoral bargaining could
prevail in some U.S. locations assuming they enact meaningful wage board
legislation and workers enjoy some degree of structural power.
Finally, Part VI lists several issues that could be explored further to
better understand the successes and failures of sectoral bargaining in
Uruguay and beyond. These include the role of the strike, the organizational
strategies undertaken by labor unions, and the importance of social and
norms in making sectoral bargaining desirable.
Part VII concludes.
II. COLLECTIVE AUTONOMY: THE PRACTICAL WISDOM OF
LABOR LAW DOCTRINE
This article is mostly concerned about how, or under what conditions, a
country can institute sectoral bargaining to revitalize labor. This question is
mostly answered with positive theory, which is tackled directly in Part III.
However, it is also worth clarifying what labor law doctrine typically
recognizes as “collective bargaining” per se in order to gain a common
understanding of this practice. Additionally, labor law doctrine, based on
over a century of experience in labor relations around the world, is also
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sensitive to what should work for effective labor relations. We will see,
especially once we discuss the concept of institutional power and the case of
Uruguay, that labor law doctrine contains some practical wisdom regarding
what makes for an effective bargaining system. Thus, the section starts with
international doctrine, as contained in international labor standards, and
particularly the concept of “collective autonomy,” given its particular
influence over labor law. It then discusses U.S. doctrine, which used to fall
more in line with international standards but has since deviated.
A. International Standards
International labor standards, as set by the International Labor
Organization (ILO), strive for effective collective bargaining.26 Guided by
this goal, and as summarized doctrinally by Professor Ruth Dukes, labor
law’s defining characteristics include “independence of the class
organizations from the state, and []distinguish[ing] the ‘autonomous’ ‘social’
law created by those organizations from ‘state’ law . . . .”27 Hence, the
autonomous parties of management and labor—free from the state, but
formally recognized as bargaining agents that can set terms for themselves,
typically with erga omnes effects—form the cornerstone of labor law.28
As Professor and Italian Constitutional Court Judge Silvana Sciarra has
also explained, labor law doctrine gauges labor union autonomy by
comparing how much governments (1) support “voluntary negotiating
systems,” (2) act as “substitutive regulatory instrument[s],” or (3) fulfill
“purely alternative and subsidiary role[s] with respect to solutions freely
adopted by the collective actors.”29 On one end, national systems could give
collective bargaining agents broad authority to set all or most terms covering
the employment relationship. On the opposite end, other systems might let
the state supplant bargained-for standards, quashing most autonomy. A third
type might simply fill gaps that collective bargaining left behind. Minimum
wage setting, as generally recognized, would thus likely fall into this third

26. See generally Convention Conerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise (No. 87), July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17. Among the most important instrument for effective
bargaining is the right to strike. See generally JEFFREY VOGT ET AL., THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2020).
27. Ruth Dukes, The Autonomy of Labour Law, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 223, 223–24 (2015)
(reviewing ALAN BOGG ET AL., THE AUTONOMY OF LABOUR LAW (2015)).
28. Id. at 224 (discussing collective autonomy in the work of Otto Kahn Freund). But see Martine
Le Friant, Collective Autonomy: Hope or Danger?, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 627 (2013) (discussing
ambiguities in the meaning of “collective autonomy” and how the principle is less recognized in French
law).
29. Silvana Sciarra, The Evolution of Collective Bargaining: Observations on a Comparison in the
Countries of the European Union, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 7 (2007).
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category, where the state steps in to legislate wages for the lowest paid
workers when they fail to set their own terms through collective bargaining.
In this light, for example, the British wage councils, which used to set
standards in “sweated trades,” were supposed to do so only until “true
collective bargaining” emerged in those industries.30
Evidence of international labor law’s preference for a broad supportive
role for collective bargaining, even in the case of minimum wages, lies in the
ILO Convention 26 of 1928, and related conventions.31 It reserves statemandated minimum wage setting for workers who are not covered by
collective agreements or workers whose wages are “exceptionally low.”32 In
this sense, Convention 26 likely extends what Professor and Judge Sciarra
referred to as a “purely alternative and subsidiary role” for government.
Additionally, even while Convention 26, like other conventions, grants
legitimacy to state-mandated minimum wages, it also establishes that
member states should consult with the “most representative organizations”
of employers and workers, or at least with any of such representatives, before
setting minimum wages.33
B. U.S. Labor Law
U.S. federal labor law and policy also once recognized the importance
of the collective autonomy of bargaining agents, even when setting minimum
wages. The 1935 Wagner Act, which provided labor organizations the right
to bargain collectively, and, concomitantly, employers with the duty to so
bargain with unions, was understood to be the principal way employees and
employers would set wages and other terms and conditions of employment
for themselves.34 The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), legislated
three years later, came to supplement the Wagner Act by providing a system
of minimum wages for workers who were not covered by collective
bargaining.35 The FLSA, as originally enacted, provided for a tripartite
minimum wage setting machinery where existing labor organizations could

30. Hayter, supra note 21, at 25.
31. See Convention Concerning the Creation of Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery (No. 26) art. 1,
June 16, 1928, 39 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ILO Convention 26]. But see Convention Concerning Minimum
Wage Fixing (No. 131) art. 1, June 22, 1970, 825 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter ILO Convention 131]
(providing that minimum wages should apply to “all groups of wage earners whose terms of employment
are such that coverage would be appropriate”).
32. ILO Convention 26, supra note 31, art. 1.
33. Id. arts. 2, 3(1)–(2); ILO Convention 131, supra note 31, arts. 1(2), 4(2)–(3).
34. See generally Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten
Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616 (2019).
35. See id. at 624–26.
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participate.36 Hence, the original New Deal labor law system, complemented
by the FLSA, fell in line with international labor standards, which presumed
the primacy of autonomous, bilateral collective bargaining and, if required,
a supplementary government-orchestrated, tripartite minimum wage
machinery for unrepresented workers.
However, the tripartite system was eliminated by a Republicancontrolled Congress in 1949, who were able to further change the law when
the New Deal coalition broke up.37 Then, Southern Democrats began to
oppose any increase to minimum wages.38 The American Federation of
Labor also started to oppose the industrial committees, maintaining its
preference for bilateral collective bargaining.39 This break left the Congress
of Industrial Organizations practically alone in defending the tripartite
system.40 In the end, labor leaders agreed to trade the industry committees
for a 75-cent minimum wage.41 Congress legislated for the wage increase
and amended the FLSA to extricate the industry committees from its text.42
The current arrangement still comports with the principle that the state
serves a subsidiary role in setting minimum wages. Collective bargaining
could be used to set wages over the ones in the law. However, the relative
disappearance of collective bargaining in U.S. life, where barely 6% of
private sector U.S. workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements,
and the absence of industry committees to set minimum wages have in
practice eviscerated collective autonomy. Similarly, and as we describe
below, the New York experience also came short in respecting the collective
autonomy of bargaining parties.
III. WHEN CAN WAGE BOARDS REVITALIZE LABOR?: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF POSITIVE THEORY
Doctrinal precepts help us understand the normative contours of a body
of law, in this case labor law, and meaningfully speak about its elements,
such as collective bargaining, regardless of its level (enterprise or sectoral).
Doctrine does not, however, necessarily help us predict whether union
membership will result if rules prescribing sectoral bargaining are included
in the law books. To understand when sectoral bargaining can be effective
36. Id. at 625.
37. See id. at 686–87.
38. Id. at 687.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 687–88.
42. Id. at 688 (citing Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, 52 Stat. 1060;
H.R. Rep. No. 81-1453, at 17 (1949)).
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requires us to consider positive theories of labor union revitalization. Hence,
this section defines theories that have been used by social scientists to
understand the conditions under which workers organize and gain new
rights—structural, institutional, and political.
A. Structural power
Since Karl Marx, analysts of labor relations have understood working
class organization to be a product of workers’ relative position in production
dynamics.43 Workers with stronger bargaining positions due to low
unemployment, or capital’s incapacity to replace them with other workers or
machines, have better opportunities to organize and strike, and thus improve
their lot. Heavily inspired by the Marxist tradition, sociologist Erik Olin
Wright argued that economic organization provides workers with “structural
power.”44 He defined structural power as: “power that results . . . from the
location of workers within the economic system. The power of workers as
individuals that results directly from tight labor markets or from the strategic
location of a particular group of workers within a key industrial sector would
constitute instances of structural power.”45 For some analysts of the Marxist
tradition, structural considerations are the ones that matter most for working
class organization.46
Marxists are not the only ones who study structural power. Other
students of socioeconomics have shown that the structure of the economy,
observed through national industrial composition ratios, matters in order to
understand the phenomenon of labor union organization as it pertains to
membership, the organization of new labor organizations, or, as we argue,
attaining rights. Social scientists Henry Farber and Bruce Western, for
example, showed that the relative displacement of traditionally unionized
industry with non-union industry in the United States best accounts for the
steady downwards slide of private-sector union membership since the
1950s.47 Research studies in other countries that focus on the way that
finance capital makes investment decisions that disfavor unionized industry

43. See BRUCE WESTERN, BETWEEN CLASS AND MARKET: POSTWAR UNIONIZATION IN
CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES 4–5 (1997) (describing Marxist reservations with labor institutions).
44. Erik Olin Wright, Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise,
105 AM. J. SOC. 957, 962 (2000). Note that Wright also considers “associational power,” which this article
refers to as “institutional power,” to be independently important to structural power. Id.
45. Id.
46. See WESTERN, supra note 43, at 5.
47. Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the Private Sector,
1973–1998, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 28–
29.
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similarly helps explain union decline.48 Hence, an important determinant of
labor union organization, both in terms of membership and the actual number
of unions in existence, might be the relative power that workers have to stave
off their own replacement and leverage that power to press for their interests.
We can thus predict that workers who sharply compete with other workers
in their own country or with workers in other countries will be less capable
to join unions, organize themselves, and open new spaces to bargain with
employers.
B. Institutional Power
A perspective on union membership that is too narrowly economic or
structural can crowd out other important explanations. Hence, analysts of
labor union revitalization also focus on institutional determinants.49 Sectoral
bargaining systems, for example, have sometimes proven significant in
helping workers maintain higher levels of organization despite economic
conditions imposed by labor markets or globalization.50 A sectoral approach
facilitates union organizing because in sector-based bargaining, unions try to
equalize conditions across heterogeneous groups of workers.51 They are less
concerned about bargaining plant-level issues and “job control.”52 As such,
in systems of sectoral bargaining, unions do not get into adversarial
relationships with plant managers who want to retain control over jobs (to
determine who to hire and fire and how to direct the workforce in the dayto-day), or at least not to the extent unions and employers typically do in
systems of enterprise bargaining. Eased tensions between management and
labor should thus be conducive to less workplace friction and employer
opposition to unions.53 Moreover, once wages are sectorally set and all
employers must pay the same wage, wages are “take[n] . . . out of
competition.”54 Employers become indifferent to the price of labor, further
lowering their opposition to unions. In fact, employers might favor sectoral
bargaining, once in place, as sectoral bargaining could help employers

48. See Christopher Kollmeyer & John Peters, Financialization and the Decline of Organized
Labor: A Study of 18 Advanced Capitalist Countries, 1970–2012, 98 SOC. FORCES 1, 20 (2019) (finding
that financialization contributes to union decline through liberalization of labor markets).
49. See WESTERN, supra note 43, at 7–9; see also Wright, supra note 44, at 962 (discussing
“associational power,” defined as “the various forms of power that result from the formation of collective
organizations of worker,” closely resembling what this article calls “institutional power”).
50. See Rosado Marzán, supra note 21, at 152 (discussing how wage boards in Puerto Rico helped
labor organize the garment industry in the 1950s–70s); see also WESTERN, supra note 43, at 64–65.
51. See generally Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679 (2014).
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 700 (internal citations omitted).
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consolidate managerial control over their firms and better dominate the
market.55 Given less employer opposition to unions in sectoral bargaining
systems, labor unions should be able to recruit more members than in
jurisdictions focused on enterprise-based bargaining.56
The practical wisdom of labor law doctrine complements a positive,
institutional view of working class organization. As explained by the positive
theory, formal rules that provide labor and management the right to set
sectoral terms through collective bargaining should provide institutional
power to the bargaining agents. This power would ease enterprise-based
tensions, set sectoral terms, and help unions be perceived as mass
organizations where worker interests are represented in crucial matters such
as wages, thereby helping unions recruit members, build new unions, and
bargain collectively.
Law might not be necessary to provide unions with institutional power
if a country can otherwise sustain sectoral bargaining through social norms.57
However, in countries where social norms are more individualistic or have
been more solidly entrenched in enterprise-based bargaining, such as the
United States, formal rules might be required. 58
C. Political Power
Despite the hypothesized relevance of institutional power, empirical
studies have shown an ambiguous relationship between sectoral bargaining
and union membership, which might dampen a union revitalization strategy
based on sectoral bargaining.59 The indeterminate relationship might be due
to intractable collective action problems.60 Structural power, as already
explained, might also interact with institutional power, explaining divergent
trends. In other words, we could observe that despite sectoral bargaining,
workers facing competition will have more difficulties organizing
themselves than those who do not.
55. See generally KEITH SISSON, LOS EMPRESARIOS Y LA NEGOCIACIÓN COLECTIVA: UN ESTUDIO
INTERNACIONAL COMPARADO [BUSINESSMEN AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL STUDY] (1990) (discussing how employers react to collective bargaining through a
comparative study of seven countries).
56. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769–70 (1983) (explaining that employer opposition to unions results
in union decline).
57. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing legislative abstentionism).
58. See infra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing individualism in the United States).
59. See Scruggs, supra note 8, at 283; Sano & Williamson, supra note 8, at 492–93; OECD, supra
note 2, § 3.3.1.
60. OECD, supra note 2, § 3.5.1. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (laying out the theory of groups and public
goods).
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Moreover, and very importantly, political power also seems to matter.61
The social democratic literature has argued for the importance of politics, as
political parties can relocate industrial disputes from the workplace to the
polity.62 By doing so, workers, through universal suffrage and parliamentary
representation, may get an important say in what eventually happens at
work.63 Hence, “Left”64 parties can promote policies that directly impact
workers’ conditions and buttress their power.65
We can extend this idea to wage boards. If political parties can help
unions use state institutions, such as wage boards, then workers can gain
power that makes those institutions work in their favor. In other words,
political power seems paramount for effective institutional power.
Scholars typically recognize a “Left” party as one with significant union
members in its ranks.66 However, more contemporary scholars have
identified “pluri-classist” or “catch-all” parties that can also promote
traditional left-leaning agendas as effective political instruments for
workers.67 In light of this literature, in this article we relax the definition of
Left parties from those parties composed mainly of union members to a pluriclassist political organization committed to progressive and perhaps even
“left” political programs. We refer to such a party as “social democratic” to
mark our break with the traditional concept of Left parties. We find it
necessary to focus on social democratic parties given the general breakdown
61. Walter Korpi & Michael Shalev, Strikes, Power, and Politics in the Western Nations, 19001976, 1 POL. POWER AND SOC. THEORY 301, 308 (1980); see also Rosado Marzán, supra note 21, at 145–
47, 153 (noting how U.S. unions strong-armed the Puerto Rican government to get a seat in its minimum
wage committees and to resolve wages with management politically).
62. Korpi & Shalev, supra note 61, at 308.
63. Id.
64. By a “Left” party we mean a party with significant membership from labor unions. WESTERN,
supra note 43, at 66, 92–93. According to some social scientists, pluri-classist parties, such as the
traditional Christian Democratic parties of Europe, might classify as “Left,” but to the extent that they
must resolve too many internal contradictions, they are less effective in using state institutions (like wage
boards) to support union growth. Id. at 80–82.
65. See id. at 66, 80–82; see also David Brady, Institutional, Economic, or Solidaristic? Assessing
Explanations for Unionization Across Affluent Democracies, 34 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 67, 80–82
(2007) (finding that higher left-wing share of governments increased union membership, while right-wing
controlled cabinets diminished unionization). But see Scruggs, supra note 8, at 283 (explaining left-wing
political party strength is not clearly conducive to unionization).
66. WESTERN, supra note 43, at 66.
67. Jorge Lanzaro, Continuidad y cambios en una vieja democracia de partidos. Uruguay 1910–
2010 [Continuity and Change in an Old Party Democracy], 100 CUADERNOS DEL CLAEH 37, 37 (2012);
see also Gerardo Caetano & José P. Rilla, Raíces y permancencias de la partidocracia uruguaya [Roots
and Permanency of Uruguayan Party Democracy], 22 SECUENCIA REVISTA DE HISTORIA Y CIENCIAS
SOCIALES 143, 145 (1992); Daniel Chasquetti & Daniel Buquet, La democracia en Uruguay: una
partidocracia de consenso [Democracy in Uruguay: Party Democracy Consensus], 42 POLÍTICA 221,
221 (2004).
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of traditional Left parties around the world,68 and their transformation to
more pluri-classist parties with “rights agendas.”69
***
Normative and positive theory on sectoral bargaining and labor union
renewal share some commonalities, or at least complement each other.
Normative theory prefers autonomous bilateral bargaining, perhaps aided by,
but never subordinated, to state control. Normative theory would support
institutional sources for worker power, such as wage boards, if these helped
to support autonomous bargaining agents. But positive theory raises further
questions, as it hypothesizes that structural power matters for union
revitalization, which dampens or neutralizes institutional power. Institutional
power might also only be accessible through political power. This explains
why sectoral bargaining might not always produce membership gains; social
democratic parties in certain countries might not have a sufficient presence
to create wage boards or, even if wage boards exist on the law books, social
democratic parties might not be able to exert sufficient influence to help
labor unions and other worker representatives make effective use of them.
As we will see below, a comparison of the U.S. and Uruguayan cases can
help us better understand the relationship between these theories to explore
how wage boards can be effective in the United States and beyond.
IV. USA: NEW YORK AS INSPIRATION
In 2016, the governor of New York, at the insistence of some organized
labor groups, including the Service Employees International Union (SEIU),
decided to increase minimum wages in the fast-food industry significantly
above the federal minimum wage.70 He did so by calling on the state’s
Commissioner of Labor to convene a minimum wage board, as the
Commissioner is empowered to do under the state laws.71 That board is,
under law, supposed to have a representative of employers and workers, in
addition to a member representing the public.72 It is supposed to hear

68. See generally ADAM PRZEWORSKI & JOHN SPRAGUE, PAPER STONES: A HISTORY OF
ELECTORAL SOCIALISM (1986) (discussing the history of electoral socialism in liberal democratic political
systems in Western countries).
69. See generally Mariana González Guyer, Nueva agenda de derechos en el Uruguay: los
procesos de reconocimiento y sus actores [New Agenda for Rights in Uruguay: The Process of
Recognition and its Actors], 220 L’ORDINAIRE DES AMÉRIQUES 1 (2016) (discussing three laws in
Uruguay that represent a new rights agenda by providing additional protections to marginalized citizens).
70. Andrias, supra note 3, at 64–67.
71. N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 653(1)–(2) (Consol. 2014).
72. Id. § 655(1); see also id. § 653(2) (stating that labor and employer representatives shall be
nominated by the American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the New York
State Business Council, respectively).
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members of the public on whether wages in a sector are sufficient to “provide
adequate maintenance and to protect the health and livelihood” of workers
and, if not, recommend to the Commissioner wage levels that can do so.73
The 2016 fast food Board representatives were the mayor of the City of
Buffalo, representing the public interest; the secretary-treasurer of the SEIU,
representing labor; and the former CEO of Gilt, the online apparel company,
representing employers.74 Many groups provided testimony to the wage
board, including the activists with the Fight for $15.75
After the public gave its opinions and the Commissioner issued a report
and advised on the level of minimum wages for fast food, the Governor
signed a law establishing that fast-food establishments in New York City
must increase their employees’ rates of pay until they reached fifteen dollars
an hour by December of 2018, and different rates for other areas of the state
until they reached fifteen dollars an hour by July 2021.76
The Fight for $15 aimed not only to get fast-food workers a better wage,
but also “a union.”77 Hence, after New York increased minimum wages, the
SEIU created a new not-for-profit organization, Fast Food Justice.78 It was a
voluntary association of fast-food workers that advocated for themselves and
their interests.79 New York City also passed a new law, commonly referred
to as the “Deductions Law,” that helped fund the new organization by giving
fast food employees the right to demand that their employers send dues
directly from their paychecks to non-union, not-for-profit groups like Fast
Food Justice.80 At least 500 workers must pledge to send money to the group
before employers are obligated to send the funds to the group.81 Fast Food
Justice sought to maintain worker voice in future minimum wage studies and

73. Id. §§ 653(1)–(2), 654, 655(3).
74. Andrias, supra note 3, at 65–66.
75. Id. at 65.
76. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 146-1.2 (2020).
77. Andrias, supra note 3, at 8 (internal citations omitted).
78. See FAST FOOD JUSTICE, https:// www.fastfoodjustice.org/about-us (last visited Sept. 22, 2021);
Max Zahn, The Future of the Low-Wage Worker Movement May Depend on a Little-Known New York
Law, IN THESE TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/20429/low-wage-workerunions-fight-for-15-New-York-workers-rights-fast-food.
79. FAST FOOD JUSTICE, supra note 78.
80. See N.Y.C., N.Y. Admin. Code § 20-1302 (2020). This law was part of a package of laws
enacted by New York City in 2017, commonly referred to as the “Fair Workweek” laws. While these
laws dealt mostly with scheduling rules, they included new rules giving employees of fast-food employers
the right to have part of their paychecks sent directly to not-for-profit organizations of the fast-food
industry. Eli Z. Freedberg et al., New York City Enacts Laws Limiting Employers’ Flexibility to Staff
Employees, LITTLER NEWS & ANALYSIS INSIGHT (June 2, 2017), https:// www.littler.com/ publicationpress/ publication/new-york-city-enacts-laws-limiting-employers-flexibility-staff.
81. N.Y.C., N.Y. Admin. Code § 20-1303(3) (2020).
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hearings, and perhaps in other forums.82 It also sought to advocate for
workers’ immigration, housing, and transportation concerns.83 The group
counted 2,000 dues-paying members.84 Its goal, however, was to recruit at
least 10,000 of the 65,000 fast food workers of New York City to build a
$1.8 million treasure chest to run its campaigns.85
The Fight for $15 movement has also been successful in getting local
and state governments to increase minimum wages substantially, including
in Washington D.C., Illinois, California, and many other jurisdictions,86
albeit not through a wage board method. Because of these and other
successes at the local and state level, economists noted that the gap between
minimum wages and the U.S. median wage has recently narrowed.87
But despite real gains, both by increasing wages for many workers and
building a new organization, fast food worker activists seem to be trying to
find an institutional foothold in New York.88 A deal struck by the parties to
extend the fifteen dollar minimum wage to the state level curtailed the power
of the Commissioner to set wages for some occupations.89 Moreover, while
many sectors of civil society participated in the process to determine wages
in the fast-food industry, labor and management did not negotiate and decide
a wage hike that directly concerned them both.90 Unlike traditional tripartite
arrangements where management and labor, in conjunction with the state,
agree on and set the terms of employment, including wages,91 the New York
system is one in which the Commissioner has the final say on wages.92 The
82. See FAST FOOD JUSTICE, supra note 78.
83. GREENHOUSE, supra note 14, at 249.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. DAVID ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR $15: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A WORKING AMERICA 193–94
(2016).
87. The Federal Minimum Wage Is Becoming Irrelevant, ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2019), https://
www.economist.com/ united-states/ 2019/04/27/the-federal-minimum-wage-is-becoming-irrelevant.
88. See Kalena Thomhave, Fighting for $15—and a Union, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 16, 2018), https://
prospect.org/ article/fighting-15-and-union (detailing how workers still lack a bargaining agent in fast
food).
89. See Kate Andrias, Social Bargaining in States and Cities: Toward a More Egalitarian and
Democratic Workplace Law, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 9 (2017).
90. Andrias, supra note 3, at 66–67.
91. For example, and as explained by Professor Anne Trebilcock, “[I]n the tripartite context of the
[International Labor Organization], the term ‘Member States’ encompasses the representatives of
Employers and Workers, who alongside those of government take the decisions about which items will
be considered for possible standard-setting.” Anne Trebilcock, Putting the Record Straight About
International Labor Standard Setting, 31 COMP. LAB. L. POL’Y J. 553, 554 (2010).
92. The New York Wage Board is appointed only to “inquire and report.” N.Y. LAB. LAW § 653
(Consol. 2021). It can conduct public hearings, report, and make recommendations to the Commissioner.
Id. § 655(3)–(5). On the other hand, the Commissioner has the authority to order minimum wages and
regulations. Id. § 657. Hence, the Commissioner sets the wages.
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tripartite wage boards can only provide a report and a recommendation.93
Moreover, employers have resisted attempts to raise wages and to organize
workers, and still do.94 McDonald’s expressly stated that it would not meet
with the Fight for $15 or the SEIU because they do “not represent any
employee in a McDonald’s restaurant.”95 Hence, while the New York case
was heralded as some sort of model for sectoral bargaining in the United
States, its results have left some labor advocates wanting more.96
V. URUGUAYAN REALITIES
This section provides an overview of how Uruguayan wage boards have
revitalized labor with much better success than New York’s recent
experience. It shows how the wage councils facilitated relatively
autonomous collective bargaining.97 Moreover, the wage councils did not
appear out of thin air. A social democratic party, the neobatllista wing of the
Colorado party of the 1940s, was important for their convening.98 The wage
boards initially worked in a manner that seemed to closely follow that
established by law, or in an “orthodox” fashion. As things progressed,
Uruguay’s executive started to gain some control over the process and the
wage boards started to function in a more “heterodox fashion.” But the
executive always respected the parties’ collective autonomy, providing an
effective system for bargaining in the country.99 In more recent years (2005–
2019), and after periods of dictatorship and neoliberal reform, the wage
boards helped to reinvigorate labor, but not without the help of another social
democratic political party, the FA.100 Some sectors, such as manufacturing,
which experienced a sharp contraction in employment, have seen a
correlative fall in union membership. Therefore, reinvigoration through the
93. Id. § 655(4)–(5).
94. In the case of New York, some employer representatives did participate and provide testimony
to the wage committees, even supporting some increases. However, the New York State Restaurant
Association did not support an increase to fifteen dollars. While stating that some employers supported
the full increase to fifteen dollars, the official government report only provided one employer name that
supported the full increase to fifteen dollars—the Vermont-based, openly-liberal company, Ben & Jerry’s
Ice Cream. FAST FOOD WAGE BD., N.Y. DEP’T LAB., REPORT OF THE FAST FOOD WAGE BOARD TO THE
NYS COMMISSIONER OF LABOR 11–12 (2015). It is safe to conclude the wage hike lacked meaningful
employer agreement.
95. GREENHOUSE, supra note 14, at 248.
96. See Tom Juravich, Fight for $15: The Limits of Symbolic Power—Juravich Comments on
Ashby, 42 LAB. STUD. J. 394, 395–96 (2017) (arguing that the Fight for $15 focused on a limited strategy
of symbolic power that requires building “structural power” against employers); see generally
Rosenblum, supra note 13 (noting lack of union gains by the Fight for $15).
97. See infra Part IV.B.
98. See Pedro Barrán & Nahum, supra note 24, at 121.
99. See infra Part IV.E.
100. See infra Part IV.I.
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wage councils has proven less effective there.101 Wage boards, as
instruments of institutional power, can help reinvigorate labor, but not
without other conditions—specifically political and economic ones—
present.
A. The Formal Architecture of the Current System
The Uruguayan structure of collective bargaining wage-setting
presently has at its highest level a Tripartite Superior Council (Consejo
Superior Tripartito) that is convened by the executive of Uruguay.102 It
determines the sectoral bargaining groups, among other things.103 The
Council first started as an ad hoc body and has existed for decades, albeit
under other names,104 and was ultimately formalized by Law 18.566 of
2009.105
At an intermediate level lie the wage councils, which are sectoral and
tripartite. Bipartite sectoral bargaining, which exists parallel to the wage
councils, also exists at this intermediate level. Wage councils negotiate
wages and at times other terms and conditions of employment.106 They were
created by Law 10.449 of 1943 and have been in operation some years since
then.107
At a lower, third level of bargaining lies plant-level collective
bargaining, which can be tripartite or bipartite.108 Bipartite, plant-based
collective bargaining existed prior to and during the eras of the wage
councils. As more fully explained below, it becomes more salient when the
wage councils are not convened, or when sector-wide collective bargaining
is harder to maintain.
101. Id.
102. Ley de Negociación Colectiva [Law of Collective Action], Law No. 18.566 ch. II et seq.,
Noviembre 11, 2009, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Uru.).
103. Id.
104. Hugo Barretto Ghione, La Negociación Colectiva En Uruguay [Collective Bargaining in
Uruguay], in ESTRATEGIAS SINDICALES POR UNA MAYOR Y MEJOR NEGOCIACIÓN COLECTIVA EN
AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE [TRADE UNION STRATEGIES FOR MORE AND BETTER COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN] 446, 454 (Confederación Sindical de
Trabajadores y Trabajadoras de las Américas & Confederación Sindical Internacional, eds., 2013).
105. Law of Collective Action, Law No. 18.566 arts. 7–10.
106. Consejo de Salarios [Wage Council], Law No. 10.449 art. 5, Noviembre 10, 1943, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Uru.).
107. See JORGE NOTARO ET AL., LAS POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS EN LA REESTRUCTURA DEL MUNDO DEL
TRABAJO: URUGUAY 2005–2009 [PUBLIC POLICIES IN THE RESTRUCTURING WORLD OF WORK:
URUGUAY 2005–2009] 49–96 (2009) (detailing the history of the wage councils from 1943–2009).
108. See Law of Collective Action, Law No. 18.566 art. 15 (providing that bipartite bargaining can
be done by sector, corporation, establishment, or any other level the parties deem appropriate, and that
lower levels bargaining shall not reduce the minimum wages agreed upon in higher levels of collective
bargaining except if otherwise provided by the applicable Salary Council).
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B. The Cornerstone 1943 Law
Law 10.449 of 1943 gave birth to the country’s wage councils. It was
enacted by the parliament at a time when the country was oriented towards
an Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model.109 Uruguay crafted the
law after a 1939 parliamentary commission denounced the poor living
conditions of industrial workers and proposed measures to improve those
conditions.110
The 1943 Law defined minimum wages as those wages that workers
require for a “sufficient standard of living” in a particular place to meet the
workers’ physical, mental, intellectual, and moral needs.111 It created wage
councils to determine those minimum wages for each industry and
occupation in the private sector.112 Under the 1943 Law, the executive could
convene the wage councils sua sponte, or if a party, management, or labor
petitioned for their summons.113 The executive also had the authority to
determine the sectoral bargaining groups.114 Each wage council would have
seven members: three representing the public interest, two representing
labor, and two representing management. One of the public representatives
would serve as president of the wage council. All employers and workers
had to formally register to vote for employer or labor members (formally
called “delegates”) of their respective wage council.115 However, the law
gave the executive the power to appoint delegates if a party, or both parties,
decided not to vote for delegates.116 In 2009, the law was amended so that
the executive could appoint the wage council members after receiving
recommendations from the most representative employer and worker
organizations.117
Wage councils had the authority to determine professional and
occupational categories within a sectoral bargaining group.118 Under the
1943 Law, the councils also had the right to inspect employers’ books and
premises, as well as to summon parties as witnesses.119
109. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 9.
110. Álvaro Rodríguez Azcúe, Los métodos de fijación del salario en el Uruguay y los
particularismos del Derecho del Trabajo [The Methods of the Fixation of Salary in Uruguay and the
Particularities of the Right to Work], 31 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO 247, 251 (2011).
111. Wage Council, Law No. 10.449 art. 1.
112. Id. art. 5.
113. Id.
114. Id. art. 6.
115. Id.
116. Id. art. 8.
117. Law of Collective Action, Law No. 18.566 art. 13.
118. Wage Council, Law No. 10.449 art. 9.
119. Id. art. 13.
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All decisions made by the wage councils required a majority vote to
pass.120 No council could issue a decision without the representatives of all
parties present to vote.121 However, the executive could always set a higher
wage with its Council of Ministers if it determined that the agreed wage was
too low.122 Moreover, parties could request the executive to review any
decision of the wage councils, unless a council’s decision was agreed to by
the employer and worker delegates.123 Wages set by the wage councils
became binding thirty days after being officially published in the Diario
Oficial.124
C. A Cold Welcome
Despite the way that the 1943 law handed minimum wage bargaining
rights to unions, the law was not enthusiastically greeted by many sectors of
the Uruguayan labor movement, which had been inspired by anarchism.
Some of these union sectors perceived the law as a top-down imposition on
their movement.125 Therefore, in the ideological context of the times, the
1943 Law was unpopular among many labor leaders and even some
academics.
It is also worth noting that Uruguay, unlike other countries in the region,
has historically lacked systematic collective bargaining rules.126 Uruguay has
been stylistically characterized as a jurisdiction where “legislative
abstentionism,” i.e., a lack of positive law, predominates in collective labor
law.127 However, for individual labor relations, legislation has been
numerous and detailed.128 The first collective bargaining law, strictly
speaking, was passed in 2009.129
120. Id. art. 14.
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 15.
123. Id. art. 19.
124. Id. The executive may also order that the wages be published in other newspapers in addition
to the Diario Oficial. Id.
125. INT’L LAB. ORG. & INSTITUTO CUESTA DUARTE [CUESA DUARTE INST.], PLENARIO
INTERSINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES - CONVENCIÓN NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES [INTER-UNION
PLENARY OF WORKERS – NAT’L CONVENTION OF WORKERS], LAS RELACIONES LABORALES EN
URUGUAY: 10 AÑOS DE CAMBIOS [LABOR RELATIONS IN URUGUAY: 10 YEARS OF CHANGE] 11 n.2, 12
n.5, 52 (2014), https:// cuestaduarte.org.uy/ sites/ default/ files/ media/ 2020-11/ Relaciones_ Laborales_
10_ anos_de_cambios_2014.pdf [hereinafter ILO & PIT-CNT]; Rodríguez Azcúe, supra note 110, at 250.
126. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 49. Some commentators have said Uruguay’s labor
legislation is “systematic, fragmentary, and punctual.” Gamonal & Arellano, supra note 22, at 178.
127. But see Gamonal Contreras & Arellano Ortiz, supra note 22, at 178 (noting Uruguay merely
has “apparent” legislative abstentionism because its wage council law has provided effective legal support
for collective bargaining).
128. See id. at 177 (listing Uruguay’s scarce collective labor legislation).
129. Law of Collective Action, Law No. 18.566. The government also enacted Law 18.508 in 2009
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D. Critics Eventually Warmed Up to the Law
Despite initial qualms with the 1943 law, union advocates—even those
with anarchist leanings—scholars, and others eventually acknowledged that
the 1943 Law was favorable to workers and their organizations.130 In 1966,
at a conference that took stock of the experience of the councils, the most
representative labor organizations of various ideological currents
substantially agreed that the law strengthened the labor movement.131 Some
scholars, who had been suspicious of the wage councils, also recognized that
the government, by convening wage councils, helped to provide labor unions
with resources to represent workers and improve their salaries or compensate
for inflation.132 They also recognized that the wage councils gave workers
access to higher-quality jobs.133
The 1943 Law also had consequences for the formation and
organization of labor and management groups. The law required that
representatives from each sector constitute themselves to bargain for the
sector.134 To no surprise, the labor movement has reported that a great part
of the labor organizations that today exist in Uruguay formed between 1930
and 1949, with the wage councils serving as important promulgators of those
unions.135 It became accepted that the wage councils consolidated labor as
an actor, centralized collective bargaining, promoted union membership, and
increased real wages.136
Students of Uruguayan industrial relations defined the post-1943 period
as the “institutionalization phase” of trade unionism.137 In the words of
Uruguayan labor law scholars, the wage councils traced a particular
“‘Uruguayan profile’ of collective bargaining, becoming the true axis and
support of the system.”138 For Professor Óscar Ermida Uriarte, they were a
to provide for collective bargaining in the public sector. Negociación Colectiva en el Marco de las
Relaciones Laborales en el Sector Público [Collective Bargaining in the Framework of Labor Relations
in the Public Sector], Law No. 18.508, Junio 26, 2009, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Uru.).
130. Rodríguez Azcúe, supra note 110, at 252.
131. Id. (citing Héctor-Hugo Barbagelata, Evolución de la negociación colectiva en el Uruguay [The
Evolution of Collective Bargaining in Uruguay], in ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA NEGOCIACIÓN COLECTIVA EN
MEMORIA DE FRANCISCO DE FERRARI [STUDIES ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN MEMORY OF
FRANCISCO DE FERRARI] 477, 488 (1973)).
132. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 50–51.
133. See id.
134. See ILO & PIT-CNT, supra note 125, at 17.
135. Id. at 17 n.17.
136. Oscar Ermida Uriarte, El protagonismo de los consejos de salarios en el sistema laboral
uruguayo [The Protoganism of the Wage Councils in the Uruguayan Labor System], 229 REVISTA DE
DERECHO LABORAL 27, 29 (2008).
137. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 53 (internal citations omitted).
138. Gamonal Contreras & Arellano Ortiz, supra note 22, at 178 (citing Héctor-Hugo Barbagelata,
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“fundamental instrument – perhaps the most important – of participation and
social dialogue in Uruguay.”139 He believed that the wage councils had “the
potential to function as a governance mechanism of the labor relations
system.”140
E. “Sliding” and “Heterodox” Application
Despite Uruguay’s historic respect for the rule of law, elements of the
law as written and as practiced began to diverge.141 At first, the government
applied the law strictly. It called on workers and employers to elect wage
council members by secret ballot.142 Thereafter, wage councils fixed wages
via majority decisions, which became known as laudos.143 The term laudo
became the colloquial, if not an extra-official, term for a “decision” or
“resolution” of the wage council pertaining to wages, as formally defined by
the law.144
However, Professor Héctor Hugo Barbagelata pointed out that not long
after passing the law, the government of Uruguay began to apply the law in
a “sliding” manner (deslizamiento)— perhaps better translated to English as
“playing fast and loose” with the law.145 In some cases, rather than waiting
for the wage councils to set wages, some employers and unions presented
their bipartite agreements to the wage councils so that the wage councils
would then issue a laudo containing identical terms, binding the entire
sector.146 It appeared that some bargaining parties preferred to freely bargain
their terms outside the strictures of the wage councils, but then used the wage
councils to rubber-stamp the terms for the entire sector.
El Contenido de los Convenios Colectivos [The Contents of Collective Agreements], in INSTITUCIONES
[INSTITUTIONS ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL
SECURITY] (1997)).
139. Ermida Uriarte, supra note 136, at 34. While recognizing that the term “social dialogue” is
recent and vague, we use it as defined here: “all forms of relationships between the actors (consultation,
collective bargaining, participation, social agreement, information, etc.), which differ from open
conflict.” Carlos M. Aloisio Duffau, Inseguridad Económica y Diálogo Social en Uruguay: Los retos de
una nueva normativa laboral [Economic Insecurity and Social Dialogue in Uruguay: The Challenges of
New Labor Norms], 157 BOLETÍN CINTERFOR 27, 28 (2006) (citing Oscar Ermida Uriarte, Diálogo social:
teoría y práctica [Social Dialogue: Theory and Practice], 201 REVISTA DE DERECHO LABORAL
MONTEVIDEO 11, 12 (2001)).
140. Ermida Uriarte, supra note 136, at 34.
141. Id. at 28.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Jorge Rosenbaum Rimolo, Los laudos de Consejos de Salarios y su regulación por la Ley
18.566 [Wage Council Reports and Their Regulation by Law 18.566], 31 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE
DERECHO 281, 282 (2011).
145. See Ermida Uriarte, supra note 136, at 28 (internal citation omitted).
146. Id.
DE DERECHO DEL TRABAJO Y DE LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL
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Additionally, as noted by Professor Ermida Uriarte, by the 1960s the
executive was also applying the law “heterodoxly,” or not strictly complying
with it, by directly appointing the employer and worker wage council
delegates.147 The executive appointed the delegates in consultation with most
representative employer and worker organizations when those organizations
informed him that they would not call for a delegate election.148 This legally
questionable practice thereafter led the executive to extend (homologar) the
laudos—an act that the executive could legally do—to protect the laudos
from judicial challenges.149 But extension also contributed to exacerbating
executive control over wage policy in Uruguay, as we will also examine
below.
F. Authoritarianism and Its Legacy
Uruguay has been one of the most long-lived social democracies in
Latin America. However, it has not been immune to dictatorship. Social and
political problems began to surface when the ISI strategy started to lose
steam in the mid-1950s.150 Economic malaise ripened into a crisis in 1965–
1966, when Uruguay suffered high rates of inflation and the existing political
institutions could no longer manage intensifying social tensions, or at least
part of the population believed so.151 In 1968, the executive power, led by
President Jorge Alejandro Pacheco of the Colorado Party, froze prices and
wages to curb inflation.152 It created and set wages through the Comisión de
Productividad, Precios e Ingresos153 (COPRIN), a new body decreed to
centrally set prices and income levels for the whole country.154 In this
manner, the executive unilaterally set wages from 1968 to 1973 through the
COPRIN.155
In 1973, Juan María Bordaberry, also of the Colorado party, who was
elected president in 1971, joined with the military to dissolve parliament and
rule by decree. Part of the justification for the coup was the threat posed by
147. Id. at 29.
148. Id. at 28.
149. Id. at 28–29.
150. Alves et al., La desigualdad del ingreso en Uruguay entre 1986 y 2009 [Income Inequality in
Uruguay Between 1986 and 2009] 1, 2 (Instituto de Economía, Working Paper No. 03/12, 2012).
151. See Marcos Supervielle & Francisco Pucci, El trabajo y las relaciones laborales en el Siglo XX
[Work and Laboral Relations in the 20th Century], in 3 EL URUGUAY DEL SIGLO XX [THE URUGUAY OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY] 77, 84 (2008).
152. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 54.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Creación de la comisión de productividad, precios e ingresos [Creation of the
Commision on Productivity, Prices, and Income], Law No. 13.720, Diciembre 16, 1968, DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] (Uru.).
155. Rodríguez Azcúe, supra note 110, at 249.
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the Tupamaros, a radical left-wing political movement that at one point acted
as an urban guerilla.156 Bordaberry’s de facto government, which lasted until
1976, reduced labor protections and promoted enterprise bargaining.157 In a
manner not too different from that of Pacheco’s, it fixed wages through
resolutions of COPRIN and its 1978 successor, the Dirección Nacional de
Costos, Precios e Ingresos (Dinacoprin).158 Later, the executive branch
simply fixed wages by unilateral decree.159 In this context of dictatorship
(1973-1985), the executive of Uruguay did not convene wage councils.
But as the saying goes in Spanish, “[t]here is no evil that can last 100
years, or body that can withstand it.” In 1983, labor activists, new and old,
created a new labor central, the Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores
(PIT),160 that in 1984 joined the Convención Nacional de Trabajadores
(CNT) under the slogan “a single union movement,” thereby forming the
current trade union central, Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores –
Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (PIT-CNT).161 In 1984, with the full
return of electoral democracy, that labor movement started to lead a new era
of intense labor conflict in Uruguay.162
G. Democratic Opening and Second Convening of Wage Councils (1985–
1990)
In 1985, the newly elected president, Julio María Sanguinetti of the
Colorado party, reconvened the wage councils. The executive board (mesa
ejecutiva) of the Concertación Nacional Programática (CONAPRO)163
recommended their summons, together with the repeal of dictatorship laws,
including those dealing with unions, collective agreements, strikes, and
government employment.164 As part of the reconvening of the wage councils,
the executive, in consultation with employer and worker representatives,
defined forty-eight sectoral bargaining groups (later forty-seven) for

156. Kristina Klimovich & Clive S. Thomas, Power Groups, Interests and Interest Groups in
Consolidated and Transitional Democracies: Comparing Uruguay and Costa Rica with Paraguay and
Haiti, 14 J. PUB. AFFS. 183, 188 (2014).
157. Supervielle & Pucci, supra note 151, at 87.
158. Rodríguez Azcúe, supra note 110, at 249.
159. Id.
160. Supervielle & Pucci, supra note 151, at 88.
161. See Breve Historia del PIT-CNT [Brief History of PIT-CNT], PIT-CNT, https:// www.pitcnt.uy/
el-pit-cnt/histori/item/6-breve-historia-del-pit-cnt (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
162. See Rodriguez Azcúe, supra note 110, at 254; NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 21.
163. CONAPRO functioned from September of 1984 through February of 1985. Its main purpose
was to develop a national dialogue to restore democracy. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 30–31.
164. Supervielle & Pucci, supra note 151, at 89.
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collective bargaining.165
Also based on the recommendations of CONAPRO, the executive
reconvened the Superior Wage Council (Consejo Superior de Salarios), the
precursor of the Tripartite Superior Council.166 But as in earlier years, the
government of Uruguay applied the 1943 Law heterodoxly.167 The executive
power placed a ceiling over wage increases to remain vigilant of inflation.168
Additionally, it set mandatory guidelines (lineamientos) for the parties and
their agreements.169 The executive also appointed the wage council delegates
after consulting with the most representative organizations, making the
agreements legally suspect, as in earlier years.170 Therefore, the executive
extended those heterodoxly arrived at laudos through decrees in order to
“legally shield” (blindar jurídicamente) them, as it did in years past.171 The
1943 Law mattered, but it was not applied to its letter.172 In this fashion, the
wage councils became a bargaining space where the parties negotiated the
contents of what would later become a state norm (an executive decree).173
Overall, the combination of mandatory bargaining guidelines, wage ceilings,
and decreed laudos gave the executive economic and political control over
the wage system.174
But despite the ways the wage councils morphed in this era, they
contributed to bringing back from the shadows a trade union movement that
had been destroyed by the dictatorship. Wage councils reinstituted collective
bargaining, centralized labor union organizations, and increased minimum
wages.175 Hence, despite more executive control over the system, scholars
and the labor movement agreed that the wage councils provided labor with
institutional resources to bargain collectively and to improve workers’
conditions in the new democratic era.176
While collective bargaining did see a renewal when the wage councils
were reconvened, the available data on union membership—union’s self165. Consejos de Salarios. Clasificación por Grupos de Actividad [Wage Councils. Classification
by Activity Groups], Law No. 178/985, Octubre 5, 1985, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Uru.).
166. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 57.
167. Ermida Uriarte, supra note 136, at 30.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. A 1988 law also gave the executive the authority to extend the laudos. Modificación del
Plan de Inversiones. Ejercicio 1988 – 1989 [Modification of the Investment Plan, Exercise 1988 – 1989],
Law No. 16.002 art. 83, Noviembre 25, 1988, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Uru.).
172. Ermida Uriarte, supra note 136, at 30.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 31.
176. Id.; ILO & PIT-CNT, supra note 125, at 22.
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reports of dues-paying members—showed declining numbers from 1985
until the mid-2000s.177 In 1985, unions self-reported over 250,000 members,
about 200,000 members in 1990, and just over 100,000 in 2003.178 Analysts
have observed that the decline in union membership during those years,
which occurred mostly in the private manufacturing sector, resulted from
significant job losses in traditionally unionized sectors and increasing levels
of unemployment.179 In the 1990s, Uruguay, along with most other Latin
American countries, implemented adjustment and structural change policies,
as well as productive restructuring and labor flexibility initiatives.180 But
union decline from 1985 to the mid-2000s cannot be entirely blamed on
economic policies and conditions. Around 1986, collective bargaining
negotiations began to slowly but consistently decentralize for several
complex and interrelated economic and political reasons.181 Adding to this
decentralizing trend, in 1988, the executive branch, under the leadership of
President Sanguinetti, established new criteria for wage council negotiations
that included the need to discuss a number of issues at the plant level, such
as the introduction of new technologies and wage-setting based on
productivity. With these and other measures, government policy started to
unravel tripartite negotiations. By 1991, one year into the government of
Luis Alberto Lacalle of the center-right “Blanco” National Party, sectoral
tripartism almost completely gave way to bipartite bargaining at the plant
level, starting a new “flex” period described below.182 This is all to say that
economic and institutional reasons appear relevant to explain union decline
during the late 1980s through the early-2000s. And given the relative absence
of social democratic currents in the Colorado party, political conditions also
mattered greatly.
H. The “Flex” Period (1991–2004)
In 1990, a period of deregulation and flexibilization was intensified
with the presidency of Luis Alberto Lacalle. The executive branch, under his
leadership, refused to convene the wage councils. Hence, while in 1985–
1989 there were a total of just forty seven enterprise collective agreements
of any sort183 in all of Uruguay, and 745 that covered a branch of industry,

177. Francisco Pucci & Mariela Quiñones, Uruguay: políticas públicas y regulación laboral
[Uruguay: Public Policies and Labor Regulation], 32 CUADERNOS DEL CENDES 173, 180 (2015).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 179–80.
180. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 62
181. Supervielle & Pucci, supra note 151, at 90.
182. Id.
183. Bipartite (“typical”) collective bargaining agreements or laudos of the wage councils.
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by 2003 there were 208 enterprise collective agreements of some sort and a
mere twenty five that covered a branch of industry.184 Sector-based collective
bargaining, i.e., the remaining twenty five agreements or so that covered a
branch industry,185 were mostly in non-tradable goods—health, construction,
and transportation.186 Sectors with historically high union membership and
strong unions were also capable of maintaining sectoral bargaining. These
included banking, frigorifics, drinks, and dairy.187 Thus, it appears that
workers with sufficient structural power, independent of the institutional
power provided by the wage councils, could preserve their sector-wide
agreements.
It became clear that government refusal to convene the wage councils,
together with many other measures of flexibility and deregulation, weakened
labor unions.188 According to some scholars, a strong individualization trend
began to characterize labor relations during those years; collective
bargaining also descended into the enterprise level.189 Work became more
precarious.190 Workers and their organizations gave priority to the defense of
jobs, suspending their traditional demands for higher wages.191 Collective
bargaining unraveled and real wages fell.192 Overall, these were tumultuous
times for labor as union membership almost halved.193 Union density
spiraled down from 38% in 1987 to 16% in 2000.194 This decline was
especially severe in the private sector, where it fell from 28% to 8% in the
same period.195 As a result, public employees became relatively
overrepresented in unions, as happened in many other jurisdictions; public
sector employees’ share of overall labor union membership increased from
49% in 1987 to 69% in 2003.196 In their absence, the wage councils showed

184. Pucci & Quiñones, supra note 177, at 178.
185. Id.
186. ILO & PIT-CNT, supra note 125, at 24.
187. See id.
188. Pucci & Quiñones, supra note 177, 176–81. Additional structural reasons for union decline
included transformations in the economy, plus a shift to outsourcing (what we now called “fissured”
work) and other marketization schemes. Id.; see also DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014)
(discussing fissured work generally).
189. Ermida Uriarte, supra note 136, at 31.
190. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 67.
191. See id. at 65.
192. Id. at 62–64.
193. Id. at 65; Pucci & Quiñones, supra note 177, at 180.
194. Pucci & Quiñones, supra note 177, at 180
195. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 65. Other reasons for union decline include changes in
industrial composition and a more open economy.
196. Id.
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that they were more than simply wage-fixing bodies.197 They supported the
collective bargaining system.198 Given other conditions, they also fomented
unionization.
I. The Third Convening (2005–2019)
Despite the fact that labor unions lost heft during the flex period, they
repositioned themselves as the clearest opposition to the neoliberal reforms
of the Colorado and Blanco parties alike.199 They also gained new legitimacy
as a symbolic representative of a broadly-defined working class, as an actor
capable of mobilizing large segments of the population, and as an actor that
could channel other popular claims not exclusively related to work and the
concerns of wage-earners.200 Labor unions also became allies of the FA,201 a
left-wing political party where communists, socialists, national-popular
groups, and others that broke with the Colorados and Blancos coalesced.202
While the FA was sometimes reticent to fully support the more clearly antineoliberal stances of the PIT-CNT, the increasing share of votes that the FA
started to receive in the 1990s raised expectations about the end of
neoliberalism among significant sectors of the labor movement.203
In 2004, the FA’s candidate, Tabaré Vázquez, was elected, ushering in
a new era for Uruguay, the labor movement, and collective bargaining.204
The FA quickly reconvened the wage councils.205 As part of the FA’s
reconvening of the wage councils, the executive also constituted and
convened the Superior Tripartite Council to, among other things, define the
sectoral bargaining groups, and to give advice for amendments to the 1943
Law.206 The Senior Tripartite Council established twenty sectoral bargaining

197. Ermida Uriarte, supra note 136, at 31.
198. Id.
199. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 66.
200. Marcos Supervielle & Mariela Quiñones, Las nuevas funciones del Sindicalismo en el cambio
del milenio [The New Functions of Syndicalism in the New Millenium], in EL URUGUAY DESDE LA
SOCIOLOGÍA [URUGUAY FROM SOCIOLOGY] (Departamento de Sociología, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales
eds., 2002).
201. Id.
202. Sebastián Etchemendy, The Rise of Segmented Neo-Corporatism in South America: Wage
Coordination in Argentina and Uruguay (2005-2015), 52 COMP. POL. STUD. 1427, 1434 (2019).
203. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 66 (citing Natalia Doglio et al., Izquierda política y
sindicatos en Uruguay (1971-2003) [Leftist Politics and Unions in Uruguay (1971-2003)], in LA
IZQUIERDA URUGUAYA ENTRE LA OPOSICIÓN Y EL GOBIERNO [THE URUGUAYAN LEFT BETWEEN THE
OPPOSITION AND THE GOVERNMENT] (Jorge Lanzaro ed., 2004)).
204. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 71.
205. Id.
206. See Consejos de Salarios. Clasificación por Grupos de Actividad [Wage Council. Classification
by Activity Groups], Law No. 105/005, Julio 3, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Uru.).
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groups, reorganizing them according to the new economic and labor realities
of Uruguay.207 Likewise, the executive created and convened for the first
time a Rural Superior Council (Consejo Rural Superior ) with the purpose of
determining criteria to establish wage councils in the country’s rural sector,
which includes agriculture, livestock, poultry farms, swine, forestry, and
other related industries, as well as to carry out the classification of the groups
of that sector.208 Also, the executive convened a bipartite roundtable to
discuss a regulatory framework for public sector collective bargaining,
which had not been sanctioned yet by law.209 Later, the legislature formally
established collective bargaining in the public sector through Law No.
18.508 of 2009.210
Hence, a very important distinction between this latest period and
previous periods was that there were multiple convenings, not just one.
These multiple convenings sought to extend the labor relations system to
sectors that had been previously excluded. The wage council system now
distinguished three areas of negotiation: the private sector (the sector
traditionally convened), the rural sector (never convened), and the public
sector (also previously excluded).
Then, in 2008, the domestic service sectoral bargaining group was also
convened for the first time, becoming Group 21 of the private sector.211
Additionally, the wage council guidelines established in 2005 were no longer
mandatory.212 Hence, under FA, the wage councils were provided with an
additional level of autonomy, different from the second period.
Beyond these important differences, Uruguay repeated practices of the
second period. The executive, in consultation and agreement with the most
representative organizations, appointed the delegates of the wage councils.213
It also extended the laudos by decree, as it did during the second period.214
Regarding the contents of the wage council agreements, the main ones
pertained to wages.215 However, as in prior periods, the wage councils agreed
on other terms. They established occupational categories, set procedures for
conflict resolution, and accorded labor peace clauses, gender equity clauses,
207.
2009).
208.
209.
210.
18.508.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Graciela Mazzuchi, Labour Relations in Uruguay, 2005–08 18 (ILO, Working Paper No. 6,
Wage Council. Classification by Activity Group, Law No. 105/005.
Mazzuchi, supra note 207, at 19.
Collective Bargaining in the Framework of Labor Relations in the Public Sector, Law No.
ILO & PIT-CNT, supra note 125, at 69.
NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 76–79.
Ermida Uriarte, supra note 136, at 32.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 35–36.
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family care clauses, professional training, among others.216 Additionally, one
of the pressing and novel challenges posed during this latest call was how to
structure negotiations by sector and enterprise because lower-level
bargaining had spread considerably in the 1990s.217
Scholars and other analysts have argued that because of this third
period, labor issues reestablished themselves in the national political agenda
and public opinion.218 First, labor unions regained their prominence.219
Second, there was a notable increase in collective bargaining. Almost all
sectors started to bargain centrally, at the wage councils, once they were
reconvened.220 Third, the minimum wage, which had been losing purchasing
power for over thirty years, increased by a whopping 57% in 2005.221 The
effects on wages were most noticeable in the lower rungs of the salary scales,
helping to narrow income inequality in the country.222 Additionally, the wage
councils, alongside other strategies, helped to formalize work, reversing
worrying trends from earlier years.223
Union self-reports also show that union membership increased almost
three-fold from 2005 to 2013.224 According to PIT-CNT, official
membership statistics225 show that there were 110,000 dues-paying union
members in Uruguay in 2003 (before the FA’s government), 240,000 in 2008
(three years after the FA assumed power), 330,000 in 2011, and 353,000 in
2013.226 The PIT-CNT estimates that these gains meant that union density
was at 15% in 2003 and doubled to 30% by 2013.227 Hence, one study
concluded that the coming to power of the FA marked a period of union
revitalization.228 Considering that unions had started campaigns to increase
union membership ten years before the FA won its first election in 2005,
with meager results, the positive outcomes after the FA came to power testify
216. Id.
217. See ILO & PIT-CNT, supra note 125, at 127.
218. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 81–96.
219. Ermida Uriarte, supra note 136, at 33.
220. Id.
221. Alves et al., supra note 150, at 9.
222. Id. (noting that wage councils contributed to narrowing income inequality from 2007–2009,
shortly after the FA won the elections).
223. JUAN PABLO MARTÍNEZ & PABLO CASALÍ, INFORMALIDAD Y POLÍTICA PARA LA
FORMALIZACIÓN LABORAL EN URUGUAY 2005 / 2016 [INFORMALITY AND POLICIES FOR LABORAL
FORMILIZATION IN URUGUAY 2005 / 2016] 151 (2019).
224. ILO & PIT-CNT, supra note 125, at 107.
225. Available membership statistics count as members only those workers who are employed in the
formal economy and who pay membership dues. Id.
226. Id. at 107.
227. Id. at 108.
228. Pucci & Quiñones, supra note 177, at 182.
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to the importance of that political victory for Uruguayan labor unions.229
We should note, however, that union membership did not only increase
because of the FA’s victory and its reactivation of the wage councils. Since
2005, the country’s economy underwent a sea change. First, unemployment
decreased dramatically during this period of significant economic growth,230
which increased the pool of workers who can join unions. The drop in
unemployment also likely increased overall bargaining power and, hence,
workers’ structural power.231 Moreover, the economy grew in specific
sectors where unions have been traditionally strong, such as in construction.
So, while in 2003 only 2.4% of all union members were in construction, by
2011 the number jumped to 6.5%.232 It had also been higher in 1990, at 5.5%
when the Uruguayan economy was in better shape.233 Manufacturing, on the
other hand, saw a dramatic fall of its total share of union membership. In
1990, before neoliberal reform had taken full force in Uruguay,
manufacturing had almost one-quarter of all union members of the country,
or 22.7%.234 Its share subsequently fell to 13.3% in 1997 and to 11.8% in
2003.235 However, by 2011, six years into the FA’s governments, the share
remained at 13.5 %, a relatively lower level.236 Hence, the available data
suggests that union membership in Uruguay, like almost everywhere else, is
sensitive to economic or structural conditions despite institutional supports.
J. Looking Ahead
On September 11, 2009, Uruguay enacted Law 18.566, which
established that employer or worker representatives may request the
executive to convene the wage councils, and, if so, the executive must
convene them within fifteen days of the request.237 In this manner, wage
council convenings no longer depend, at least by law, exclusively on the
executive and the government of the day. This is an important change. It
attempts to make collective bargaining less dependent on partisan politics.
The 2009 law is being put to the test now. It appears to be working. In
229. Id.
230. NOTARO ET AL., supra note 107, at 81.
231. See generally Orley Ashenfelter & John Pencavel, American Trade Union Growth: 1900-1960,
83 Q.J. ECON. 434 (1969) (explaining the negative relationship between unemployment and union
growth).
232. ILO & PIT-CNT, supra note 125, at 109.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Sistema de Negociación Colectiva [Collective Bargaining System], Law No. 18.566 art. 12,
Septiembre 11, 2009, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Uru.).
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2020, a new right-of-center government headed by president Lacalle Pou
took the reins of the country, after almost fifteen years of social democratic
governments of the FA. The results remain mixed and still uncertain,
especially given the complexities posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Given
the pandemic, the government, in consultation with employer and worker
representatives, extended the prior agreements without bargaining for new
terms. In June of 2021, the government then convened the Tripartite Superior
Council. On the one hand, the 2021 convening has amounted to good news,
since a center-right party, not a social-democratic party, was convening the
Tripartite Superior Council. On the other hand, the government has also been
advocating that special consideration be given to those sectors most affected
by the COVID-19 pandemic. Special terms include: extension of the old
agreements; guidelines that moderate, if not freeze, wages in those sectors;
and special dispensation to employers hit especially hard by the pandemic to
be released from new sectoral standards. We think, although it might be too
early to accurately determine, that the new convening might lead to
significant decentralization, as happened during the “flex” period.
VI. ANALYSIS
The case of Uruguay shows that wage boards can help to revitalize
labor. While union membership numbers were not available for us to
evaluate the first convening (1943–1968), qualitative assessments, especially
by initial critics and skeptics of the wage councils, provide evidence that the
wage councils helped to organize new labor unions. The law also helped
labor organizations centralize and consolidate. Some union revitalization did
occur. And all of this required that the wage councils be convened, which in
turn needed a political party in power willing and capable of doing so. In the
first period described, this meant the social democratic neobatllistas of the
Colorado party.
Refusal to convene the wage councils by the dictatorship exposed the
underbelly of state-managed wage councils. Once democracy resurfaced,
labor unions reasserted themselves, consolidated into a new central labor
organization, the PIT-CNT, and demanded the reconvening of the councils
alongside other sectors of civil society as part of a larger set of demands to
democratize the country. By then, the social-democratic batllista wing of the
Colorados had lost influence in the party, while the center-right had been
gaining ground. However, the Colorados convened the wage councils due to
democratization pressures.
The second period had several mixed qualities. On one hand, despite
the return to democracy, the executive retained significant control over the
wage council system. It set mandatory guidelines and could, in theory, refuse
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to decree the laudos. However, in practice, the executive never exercised that
refusal authority. Hence, analysts commented that collective bargaining
experienced a boost—workers regained a space to bargain collectively and
real minimum wages increased. Overall, the autonomy of the parties was de
facto honored. But despite the return to democracy and the reconvening of
the wage councils, union membership slid. Economic restructuring
weakened unions. Moreover, decentralization, itself a product of government
economic policy, eroded unions’ institutional power. Both conditions fared
ill for union membership, one of the key determinants we have focused on
to analyze labor revitalization. The absence of a social democratic
government, and the presence of a government promoting neoliberal
policies, had a negative impact on overall union power. Eventually,
Uruguayan governments refused to convene the wage councils, sending
labor unions into crisis.
Crisis, however, forced the labor movement to reorient itself as a more
symbolic representative of workers, to lead popular protests, and to become
a vocal participant in public debates. It also became an important ally of the
growing FA.
After its victory in 2005, the FA reconvened the wage councils, marking
a historic third period of those bodies, and again showing the importance of
a social democratic party. Real wages improved. Union density also
increased from about 15 % to 30 %.238 New organizations, such as domestic
worker and employer organizations, formed as a consequence of the
government’s convening regarding the negotiation of minimum wages.
However, the increase in union membership was not the same for workers of
all sectors. Manufacturing, for example, lost its relative share of union
membership given the openness of the sector.239 Political power seems very
important for unions to wield institutional power, but structural power also
matters.
A. Seven hypotheses for the United States
What lessons can the United States, and perhaps others, learn from
Uruguay? First, we must start by noting that Uruguayan law extended
bargaining authority and autonomy to the parties—labor and management—
to bargain for minimum wages in a sector, thereby extending institutional
power to unions and employers. The state of New York, as described in Part
IV of this article, does not. New York State law gives authority to labor and

238. ILO & PIT-CNT, supra note 125, at 108.
239. Workers have lost jobs in manufacturing while construction has seen a spike in new hires,
thereby also contributing to the relative increase in labor membership share in construction.
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management agents that are not necessarily representative of the sectors in
question to recommend minimum wages to the state authorities. The New
York executive retains the final word on wages. Hence, the first major
difference between Uruguay and the United States (if we use New York State
as a proxy) is that the United States does not afford bargaining parties with
authority and autonomy to bargain for minimum wages in a sector. This lack
of institutional power in the United States explains a lot of the spotty results
in 2016 that led some labor advocates to feel underwhelmed by the wage
board strategy in New York.
Of course, advocates of sectoral bargaining, including Professor
Andrias, want to see new laws giving workers and employers the authority
and autonomy to bargain for minimum wages in a sector. After all, Professor
Andrias calls for a “new labor law.”240 We could thus hypothesize that (1) if
a U.S. federal, state, or local jurisdiction gives labor and management formal
authority to bargain sectorally for minimum wages, then the probability of
the parties’ sectoral convening increases; and (2) if the probability of the
parties’ convening increases, the probability of union revitalization also
increases.
However, this article has shown that even when such laws are put on
the books, it may not be put into practice without a social democratic party
in power and willing to convene the wage boards. At first blush, the absence
of a national social democratic party and a strong socialist tradition in the
United States spells trouble for U.S. sectoral bargaining.241 The Republican
party is not remotely social democratic. While some social democrats such
as Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez hold some sway in the
Democratic Party, they do not define the party; they lie more at its margins
than its center. The current-day Democratic Party is not a neobatllista or FA
grouping.
Absence of a social democratic party in the United States might not end
the political analysis for wage boards, however. First, one piece of good
news for U.S. labor advocates and reformers, as evidenced by the case of
Uruguay, is that wage board arrangements need not require a traditional Left
party with extensive labor union membership. A pluri-classist party, like the
U.S. Democratic party, could do the job. Second, while Uruguay showed that
a party committed to convening wage boards due to its ideological and
programmatic proclivities is necessary for the wage boards to exist in
practice, the correlation between board convenings and social democratic
240. Andrias, supra note 22, at 8–11.
241. See generally SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & GARY MARKS, IT DIDN’T HAPPEN HERE: WHY
SOCIALISM FAILED IN THE UNITED STATES (2000) (explaining the relative absence of socialism in United
States history).
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parties was not 100%. In the 1980s, when the country returned to democracy
after a period of brutal dictatorship, wage boards were convened by
governments that were no longer social democratic. The new Colorado
democratic government convened the councils after it was recommended by
CONAPRO to restore democratic governance. Moreover, a center-right
party is convening wage boards as of this writing. In this sense, particular
political conditions, especially those marked by breaks from politics of labor
repression as occurred during the dictatorship, or strong pressures from a
robust labor movement and electorate to convene the wage councils or
boards might compel a non-social democratic party to convene wage boards.
Hence, a third hypothesis: (3) if a U.S. federal, state, or local jurisdiction,
with a government with legal authority to convene wage boards, is governed
by a political party with a government program identified with the wage
boards, then the probability for a wage board convening in that jurisdiction
increases, and the probability for union revitalization also increases.
However, (4) if a U.S. federal, state, or local jurisdiction is governed by a
right-of-center party, and that government has legal authority to set
bargaining guidelines, and that government convenes wage boards, then the
probability that the government will use the boards to decentralize
bargaining increases. Relatedly, (5) if government uses wage boards to
decentralize bargaining, then the probabilities for union revitalization
decrease. The Uruguayan experience of the late 1980s and 1990s, and
perhaps, to some extent the 2021 experience suggest these latter two
hypotheses.
Moreover, while U.S. federal wage boards might still appear utopian
for the United States, some states, cities, and other localities with strong
progressive Democratic support might be ripe for sectoral bargaining
through wage boards, as Professor Andrias and others have argued.242
Sectoral bargaining could also prevail nationally for limited bargaining
issues, such as to set occupational health and safety standards during a
pandemic.243 We could thus hypothesize that (6) in those states and localities
where the Democratic Party holds more complete control of government,
including executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and where progressive
Democrats have more sway, the probabilities of implementing an effective
wage board increases, and probabilities for labor revitalization also
increases.
Finally, we should remember that institutional and political power are
242. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 89.
243. See Sharon Block, Brishen Rogers & Benjamin Sachs, A Safer, More Equitable Reopening,
ONLABOR (May 20, 2020), https:// onlabor.org/ a- safer- more- equitable- reopening/ (discussing the
Essential Workers Bill of Rights bill, which calls for a similar proposal).
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not the be-all and end-all for effective wage boards that can help to revitalize
labor unions. Economics also matter. The United States is recognized as one
of the most open world economies, 244 making it more challenging for
workers to unionize and combine without fearing replacement. U.S. policy
could thus help protect U.S. workers from markets or make workers stronger
market players (by investing in their skills and education, for example).
Hence, we can hypothesize that (7) if U.S. policy helps protect U.S. workers
from markets, or promotes investing in their education and skills, the
probability of labor union revitalization would increase.
B. One Pending Issue: The Strike
One key issue not discussed in this article is the strike. In Uruguay,
workers have ample rights to strike, which are guaranteed by the Uruguayan
constitution and the international instruments it has ratified, such as
Convention 87 of the ILO and the Mercosur Declaration.245 Moreover,
Uruguay’s legislative abstentionism in collective labor law has meant that
the strike remains mostly unregulated; as a result, the constitutional right to
strike is very broad.246 Given U.S. legal restrictions to the right to strike,
including limits on secondary strikes and boycotts (which are crucial for
solidarity actions) and sanctions on permanent strike replacements,247 the
U.S. and Uruguay are worlds apart on the right to strike. Uruguayan unions
seem to better enjoy this important institutional source of power. Further
244. According to the Heritage Foundation’s index of economic openness, the United States shows
a high level of trade freedom, scoring about 86 of 100 points. Uruguay is relatively less open, receiving
about 80 points. Singapore, one of the world’s most open economies, stands at 90 points, while Chad is
among the less open, receiving about 52 points. Trade Freedom Score, WORLD BANK, https://
tcdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/ trade.free.scr?country= USA&indicator= 757& countries= URY,
SGP,TCD, MMR&viz= line_ chart&years= 2014,2018 (last visited Feb. 6, 2021). However, some
important analysts, such as the former director of the World Bank and Nobel Laurate, Joseph Stiglitz,
have challenged the view that the U.S. is an open economy, given how its trade agreements have favored
U.S. corporations over others. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Joseph Stiglitz: US Trade Deals Were Designed to
Serve Corporations at the Expense of Workers, CNBC (Apr. 21, 2019, 9:19 PM), https:// www.cnbc.com/
2019/ 04/22/joseph-stiglitz-us-trade-deals-helped-corporations-and-hurt-workers.html.
245. Gamonal Contreras & Arellano Ortiz, supra note 22, at 182 n.46.
246. Id. at 182. We should note, however, that a very recent law includes language that appears to
limit the right to strike. See Poder Ejecutivo Consejo de Ministros [Executive Power of the Council of
Ministers], Law No. 19.889 art. 392, Julio 9, 2020, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Uru.). Commonly called the
Ley de Urgente Consideración (LUC), this law, among other things, limits worker occupations of
workplaces. Article 392, titled “Freedom of work and management rights to the enterprise,” establishes
that “[t]he State guarantees the peaceful exercise of the right to strike, the right of non-strikers to access
and work in the respective establishments, and the right of the management of the enterprises to enter the
facilities freely.” Id. The FA and the labor movement are currently gathering signatures to seek recission
of article 392 of the LUC.
247. LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 38–39 (2000).
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research on Uruguay, and perhaps other jurisdictions with wage boards,
could focus on how workers’ rights to strike and their strike actions might
affect the efficacy of the wage board model.248
C. Another Pending Issue: Organizational Strategies
Another issue left untouched by this article is how unions organize
workers within a system of sectoral bargaining through wage boards. As we
stated in passing here, Uruguayan labor unions engaged in membership
campaigns. In the flex era, those campaigns did not yield too many new
members, but once the FA convened the wage councils, the membership
campaigns gave fruit. But other than the facts stated here, we could not
provide detailed information about organizing campaigns in Uruguay,
mostly because the evidence is not available; obtaining it requires original
research.249
However, other researchers have provided evidence showing that
organizing matters. Professor Guy Mundlak, for example, in a study of
hybrid (i.e., social or sectoral and enterprise bargaining) systems in four
countries has shown the challenges, but also the need, for proactive union
member organizing under any system of collective bargaining.250 And in
prior work, one of us showed that despite Puerto Rico’s sectoral minimum
wage committees, U.S. unions had to engage in old-fashioned, plant-by-plant
organizing in the territory in order to recruit union members.251 Purely topdown strategies thus do not appear effective to organize new union members.
Details about how Uruguayan unions organize workers would help explain
how organizing matters.
D. A Third Pending Issue: Social Norms
We should also underscore another point not addressed above, but
which may matter to better understand the relative success of Uruguay: how
its political culture and social norms of its people facilitate sectoral
bargaining. Other research has shown that social norms favorable to
collective bargaining matter.252 And Uruguay’s unions function in a national
248. We thank Professor Kate Andrias for suggesting this point.
249. And the fact is that workers do not automatically flock to unions once the sectoral system is in
place. See generally Matthew Ginsburg, Nothing New Under the Sun: “The New Labor Law” Must Still
Grapple with the Traditional Challenges of Firm-Based Organizing and Building Self-Sustainable
Worker Organizations, 126 YALE L.J.F. 488 (2017) (discussing numerous other challenges to labor
organization efforts).
250. See GUY MUNDLAK, ORGANIZING MATTERS: TWO LOGICS OF TRADE UNION REPRESENTATION
217–18 (2020).
251. Rosado Marzán, supra note 21, at 149–52.
252. Id. at 149–52, 154 (noting how pre-existing relationships between garment employers and
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context where social dialogue pervades.253 It might be true that Uruguay does
not have the high levels of consensus that exist in Nordic countries, where
sectoral bargaining is well-institutionalized.254 Uruguay’s system of wage
boards has been opposed by the political Right and by business groups,
requiring FA victories in recent years for the wage councils to be
convened.255 However, “social dialogue” is a recurring catchphrase in
Uruguayan public discourse,256 alongside “citizen participation”
(participation ciudadana), which contrasts with the political culture in more
liberal contexts such as in the United States where individualism is more
highly valued, and libertarianism seems to have taken firm hold of some
political sectors. Similarly, Uruguayan historians have identified Uruguay as
a country of “closeness” (país de cercanías)257 where one could presume that
civil society, including labor unions, may participate in associational life to
a greater extent than in more “arm’s length” jurisdictions, such as the United
States. In fact, U.S. social scientists and other commentators have argued
that individualism pervades where a liberal market economy bereft of
significant coordination is dominant.258 In more recent years, a deeply
concerning politics of polarization has become the new norm in the United
States, further corroding cooperation between competitors and rivals.259 But
the U.S. has not always been fragmented. Sociologist Robert Putnam, for
example, described a post-World War II era when U.S. associationism was
high, which is the same era when U.S. unions were at their cusp.260 Future
unions in Puerto Rico facilitated collective bargaining); see also Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 6, at
517–19 (discussing a vast literature on how social norms structure industrial relations systems and arguing
that U.S. unions supported a “moral economy” where norms of equity reduced inequality in pay).
253. See generally Marianela Boliolo et al., Diálogo Social en los Consejos de Salarios: El caso del
Grupo No. 8, Subgrupo 1 y las Categorías Laborales [Social Dialogue in the Wage Councils: The Case
of Group 8, Subgroup 1 and the Labor Categories], 157 BOLETÍN CINTERFOR 47 (2006) (noting
Uruguay’s history with social dialogue).
254. Etchemendy, supra note 202, at 1457.
255. Id.
256. See generally Ana Laura Ermida & Sofía Manisse, Experiencias de diálogo social y nuevas
formas de gobernabilidad [Experiences in Social Dialogue and the New Forms of Governing], SECOND
ISA F. SOCIO. (Aug. 3, 2012, 10:45 AM), https:// isaconf.confex.com/ isaconf/ forum2012/ webprogram/
Paper21620.html.
257. CARLOS REAL DE AZÚA, EL IMPULSO Y SU FRENO: TRES DÉCADAS DE BATLLISMO Y LAS
RAÍCES DE LA CRISIS URUGUAYA [THE IMPULSE AND ITS BRAKES: THREE DECADES OF BATTLISMO AND
THE ROOTS OF THE URUGUAYAN CRISIS] 7 (1964).
258. See, e.g., Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1–8
(Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, eds., 2001) (describing coordinated market economies and the
institutions they require).
259. See generally EZRA KLEIN, WHY WE ARE POLARIZED (2020).
260. See generally ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
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research could try to understand how a project promoting sectoral bargaining
could tap into associational traditions that, while perhaps dormant, are not
entirely antithetical to the American creed.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article was motivated by the question of whether sectoral
bargaining through wage boards can help increase union membership and
reinvigorate labor unions. We raised the question because U.S. labor
advocates and academics, inspired by the 2016 experience in New York
State, are now interested in the issue. There, the state used its seldomconvened wage board to increase minimum wages in fast food to fifteen
dollars. Labor advocates also formed a non-union, worker advocacy group
called Fast Food Justice. However, as this article explains, some labor
advocates were left wanting more, as the New York experience did not
promote union membership growth, the formation of new labor unions, or
the expansion of spaces for meaningful collective bargaining. This article
thus summarized normative and positive theories to help us better
comprehend basic elements of collective bargaining and when we could
expect sectoral bargaining to promote labor revitalization. It also used the
case of Uruguay, a successful case of labor union revitalization though wage
boards, to lend empirical support to the theories. We learned that Uruguayan
law provided unions and employers with collective autonomy to bargain in
the wage councils, which in turn extended institutional power to unions and
employers, thereby complementing workers’ (and employers’) structural
power. Social democratic parties were also key in convening the wage
councils, thus making the whole system politically viable.
This article did not exhaust all conditions that might have made
Uruguayan wage boards effective. Strikes and strike rights, organizational
strategies, and social norms of the country might also be worth exploring to
better understand the success of the Uruguayan wage board system, and
perhaps those of others.
The evidence presented offers a sobering picture for the United States
in comparison to Uruguay. The U.S. lacks a strong social democratic party.
Moreover, practically no state or local authority truly affords labor and
management the right to bargain sectorally over minimum wages. And,
being in a relatively open, liberal market economy, many U.S. workers are
in a weak structural position to use wage boards effectively.
But not all the news were negative. Some states and local governments,
where progressive (social democratic) politicians prevail, might give unions
and employers the right to set sectoral wages. Even where progressive
Democrats do not prevail, the complex nature of politics might compel any
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government administration to enact a wage board system if wage boards
were somehow linked to a larger and desirable political program, such as
was the case for democratization in Uruguay in the 1980s.
In closing, and perhaps in an additional effort towards optimism, we
encourage U.S. policymakers, advocates, and scholars to discuss out-of-thebox ideas, such as sectoral bargaining through wage boards, not only because
they could be implemented at the state or local levels, but also because they
might, at some unknown time, be feasible nationally. Sectoral bargaining
through wage boards has had a past in the United States, such as during the
first years of the FLSA. That tradition could be revived. As Professor Harry
Arthurs has remarked when reflecting on the future of labor law, and citing
historian Daniel Rodgers, “One of the most important consequences of
crises . . . is that they ratchet up the value of policy ideas that are waiting in
the wings, already formed though not yet politically enactable.”261
Developing ideas thus remains an important task independent of the political
and social conditions necessary to make those ideas real.

261. Harry Arthurs, Labour Law after Labour 413–16 (Osgoode Hall Law School, Comparative
Research in Law & Political Economy, Research Paper No. 15/2011, 2011) (citing DANIEL RODGERS,
ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998)).

